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Abstract This paper investigates whether small countries gain relatively more
than large countries from an ‘expansion’ of their market through the creation of a
single currency. The introduction of the euro offers a particularly valuable source to
test this hypothesis, which we motivate using the theoretical model by Casella of the
year 1996. Our results from a panel data analysis, using both aggregate and di-
saggregated trade data, point to a statistically significant but quantitatively moderate
small country bonus. On average, the euro has led to an improvement of the small
euro area’s relative export performance by 3–9%.
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JEL classification C33  F12  F15
1 Introduction
There is wide agreement that the introduction of the euro has led to an increase in
trade of the euro area member states, though the magnitude of the estimates varies
considerable across studies. In his comprehensive survey, Baldwin finds that the
effect is likely to lie ‘‘somewhere between 5 and 15%, with 9% being the best
estimate’’ (Baldwin 2006: 1).
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This paper considers whether small countries gained relatively more from the
introduction of the euro. Our hypothesis is based on two assumptions: (i) The size of
the domestic market is an important determinant of competitiveness. (ii) The
introduction of the euro has lead to a reduction in trade costs.
In that case it may be argued that the euro has increased the size of the market
that euro area countries can reach with relative ease. This increase is more
significant for small countries, whose domestic market is small. As a consequence,
the increase in competitiveness is relatively larger for small countries, which are
thus favoured by the euro. A theoretical model, formalising this argument, is
derived by Casella (1996), who considers the distribution of the gains from
enlarging a trade block among its member states in a new-trade theory model with
increasing returns and monopolistic competition. As we argue more in detail below,
the implications of this model do also apply to the introduction of a single currency.
Moreover, the introduction of the euro offers a particularly valuable source for
testing for a small country bonus with respect to the gains in trade from a market
expansion. First, the sample of euro area countries is relatively large and there are
considerable differences in country size. Second, the ‘market expansion’ through
the euro was sizeable. Third, the ‘market expansion’ is not only larger for small
countries in relative terms (as required theoretically) but also in absolute terms.
Fourth, there is high quality data available for trade of the euro area countries, both
at the aggregate and disaggregated level.
We use a panel data approach, considering a relative gravity equation where the
dependent variable is the ratio of the large to the small country’s exports to other
euro area countries over the period 1994–2005. The model is estimated using both
aggregate trade and disaggregated trade data at the SITC1, SITC2, and SITC3 level.
Overall, our results are supportive to the theoretical predictions by Casella
(1996). At the industry level, in a majority of the SITC groups considered, we find
that small countries gained more on average. This is confirmed if we aggregate the
industry-specific results and also if we estimate the model for aggregate exports. On
average over all models, we find that the euro has led to an improvement of the
small euro area countries’ export performance by some 3–9%. Moreover, there is
also evidence that the relative gains of the small countries are larger, the larger the
size difference to the large country.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the
theoretical background and sets up the empirical model. Section 3 presents the
estimation results. Section 4 summarises the results and concludes.
2 Theoretical background and empirical model
2.1 Country size and the introduction of the euro
Before we set up the empirical model, we briefly review the theoretical reference
model by Casella (1996). The world consists of N countries, part of them belonging
to the trade bloc. Markets are characterised by monopolistic competition and
increasing returns, allowing firms with a larger domestic market to produce at lower
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costs. Obstacles to trade are equal to zero at the domestic market, take a positive
value within the trade bloc, and are highest for trade with countries outside the trade
bloc. Two factors are employed in the production of K different goods: (immobile)
skilled labour and (mobile) unskilled labour. The presence of fixed costs implies
that each firm specialises in the production of one variety. An equilibrium of this
model specifies the prices of all goods, the distribution of low-skilled workers
among the countries within the trade bloc, wages and profits such that all markets
clear, consumers maximise their utility, firms maximise profits, and no low-skilled
workers can benefit from migration within the trade bloc.
What happens, if one or more countries enter the trade bloc? Technically, the
changes in equilibrium are triggered by the possibility of migration and changes in
consumer prices. But as Casella (1996) argues the main lessons of the model can be
read more broadly: enlarging a trade bloc increases the size of the market that a firm
can reach with relative ease. This increase will be more significant for firms located
in small countries, whose own domestic market is small. This means that the
increases in competitiveness are relatively larger for (firms in) small countries, such
that the entry of new members in a trade bloc will favour small countries. This
conclusion is reached by Casella (1996): 405, proposition 4) both analytically and in
a number of numerical simulations.
In fact, the message of this model is very intuitive and general. If country size
matters and favours large countries over small countries with respect to export
performance, any enlargement of the domestic market will allow the small country
to partially offset its initial disadvantage over large countries. In other words, small
countries gain more from the enlargement in the sense that they will improve their
export performances relative to the large countries.
This theoretical result can be tested by the study of the development of relative
sales volumes. Badinger and Breuss (2006) consider the enlargements of the
European Community (EC) by Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973
and Greece in 1981, as well as the free trade agreements between the EC and the
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the 1970s. The results
are largely inconclusive; the authors stress that the mechanism favouring small
countries appears to exist, but that for the sample considered, it is partially offset or
even dominated by other forces favouring large countries (such as more group ties,
higher market power and related terms-of-trade effects, larger absolute endowments
with human capital, and a larger product variety).
We will now consider how the model by Casella (1996) applies to the
introduction of the euro. Notice, that in the model, joining a trade bloc means
nothing else but a reduction of the acceding country’s trade costs vis-a`-vis all ‘old’
members of the trade bloc, and simultaneously, a joint reduction of these old
members’ trade costs vis-a`-vis the joining country. Hence, exactly the same
reasoning applies to the introduction of the euro. The introduction of the euro
increases the size of the market (by all other euro area countries) that a firm can
reach with relative ease. This increase will be more significant for firms located in
small euro area countries, such that the introduction of the euro should particularly
favour small countries.
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Generally speaking, the introduction of the euro makes access to other euro area
countries easier by reducing trade costs, e.g. by eliminating transaction costs,
resulting from the need to exchange currencies or to hedge against exchange rate
changes vis-a`-vis euro area countries.
Hence, the present paper is placed in the framework of the traditional view that
sees the trade effects of the euro as mainly passing through the channel of a
reduction in transaction costs. An alternative view, the so-called ‘new goods’
hypothesis (Baldwin 2006), argues that a single currency reduces the fixed costs of
market entry. It is an empirical question, unrelated with country size in principle,
whether there are more or less firms in a country, relative to another, which are just
below the efficiency threshold and can take advantage of the reduction of fixed
costs. As a consequence, it is important to keep in mind that our empirical testing
strategy is directed towards capturing asymmetries in the gains from a ‘market
expansion’ with respect to country size, rather than to give a full account of the
trade effects of the euro.
A test for asymmetries in the trade effects of the euro with respect to country size
is not only of interest in itself. For several reasons, the introduction of the euro
offers a particularly suitable case to test the more general hypothesis that small
countries can improve their relative export performance as a result of a ‘market
expansion’:
(i) The size of enlargement (of the trading partner against which a reduction of
trade costs takes place) is important for the small country bonus to show up in
the data. Since intra–euro area trade makes up some 60% of total trade, the
introduction of the euro constitutes a sizeable market expansion, larger than
any EU enlargement before.
(ii) In the model by Casella (1996), the reason that small countries gain more is
that their relative market expansion is larger. This is true for the introduction
of a single currency as well. In addition, the absolute market expansion is
greater for small countries here as well, bearing in mind that the ‘new’ market
(to which access has become easier) is the total euro area excluding the
respective domestic market (which is smaller for the small country).
(iii) As opposed to previous enlargements of the EC, there is a relatively large
sample of member countries within the euro area with significant differences
in size. This increases the number of observations, on which the model can be
tested.
(iv) Finally, the euro was introduced at a time period, for which comprehensive,
high quality data is available. This enables us to test for a small country bonus
using both aggregate and disaggregated export data at the SITC1, SITC2, and
SITC3 level. This is potentially important, to account for the intra-industry
trade setup of the model by Casella (1996).
It is worth emphasising that an assumption underlying our test is that the size of
the domestic market matters. Hence, our empirical analysis is in some way also an
indirect test of the relevance of market size, which has been called into question by
Rose (2006). Moreover, a further important assumption is that the EU (euro area)
countries are not fully integrated: if there were a true Single Market in the EU, all
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countries would have the same ‘domestic’ market; as a consequence, there would be
no difference in the relative increase of the euro area countries’ domestic markets
and the theoretical reasoning in Casella (1996) would not apply any more. But the
EU is still far away from a true Single Market. Apart from legal barriers that still
exist in many industries, particularly service industries (see, for example, European
Commission (2002)), there are also cultural and language barriers (hindering
migration in particular). This is also supported by the results of Chen (2004), who
shows that there are still significant border effects on trade flows within the EU.
This suggests that there are still sizeable trade costs within the euro area, part of
which have been eliminated by introducing the euro.
2.2 The empirical model
Our basic specification follows closely Casella (1996) and Badinger and Breuss
(2006). It is based on a simple gravity approach in ratios, relating relative exports
(X) of the large and small country to relative GDP, the relative real effective
exchange rate (ER) and a euro dummy (D€):
ln
X€L;t
X€S;t
¼ a þ b1 ln
GDPL;t
GDPS;t
þ b2 ln
ERL;t
ERS;t
þ cD€t þ ut; ð1Þ
where XL,t
€ are exports from the large country L to other euro area countries
(excluding the small country S), and XS,t
€ are exports from the small country S to
other euro area countries (excluding the large country L), both in nominal terms1;
GDPL,t (GDPS,t) is real GDP of the large country L (small country S); ERL,t (ERS,t)
is the real exchange rate of large (small) country L (S) against the euro area, and Dt
€
is a euro dummy, taking a value of zero before the introduction of the euro and 1
afterwards). Finally, t is the time index and ut is a standard error term.
Our sample comprises 10 euro area countries (Belgium and Luxembourg are
treated as aggregate) and covers the period 1994–2005. Data on trade flows are from
the UN COMTRADE database and were downloaded from the database of the
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO). Data on real GDP (2000 prices
and 2000 purchasing power parties (PPPs)) are taken from the OECD Economic
Outlook Database. Data on real effective exchange rates against the euro area are
from the European Commission (2007) and based on unit labour costs.
Apart from the fact that the specification in ratios follows from the implications
of the theoretical model, it has the important advantage that it implicitly controls for
shocks affecting small and large euro area countries alike, i.e. shocks which are not
systematically related to country size. This is particularly important, since the
1 Real exports would be preferable from a theoretical perspective, but the proper deflators for the nominal
series, i.e., price indices for exports to the euro area, are not available for most of our observations, in
particular at the disaggregated level. However, the ratio of the large to the small country’s price level is
captured by the constant term, such that only the difference in the change of the large and small country’s
price level could affect our estimates. This difference, in turn, is largely determined by factors unrelated
to relative country size (e.g. the change in the monetary regime) and can thus be reasonably assumed to be
captured by the error term to a large extent without systematically biasing the estimates of our parameter
of main interest, i.e. the euro dummy.
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introduction of the euro took place at the same time as other important
transformations in the world economy, for example the emergence of China and
other Asian emerging economies, progress in globalisation or the fact that 10 new
countries joined the European Union in 2004.
Equation 1 in ratios is also consistent with simple versions of the gravity
equation where time invariant determinants common in gravity equations (such as
distance, common border, and common language) are captured by the constant. The
parameter c measures changes in the relative export performance of the large
country as a result of the euro; according to the theoretical model we expect a
negative value, indicating that the small country gained relatively more in trade with
other euro area countries than the large country.
Several comments are in order here: as far as the dependent variable (exports to
euro area) is concerned, we impose a ‘comparability constraint’. In particular, to
ensure that the destination market is the same in the numerator (for the large country
L) and in the denominator (for the small country S), we consider only exports to
euro area countries other than exports to the large country L and the small country
S.2
According to the theoretical model by Casella (1996), the improvement in the
small country’s relative export performance should show up in relative exports to
each single euro area destination market. As mentioned above, the most promising
testing strategy is using a possibly large destination market. Hence, the compara-
bility constraint follows naturally from the theoretical model by summing up—for
each pair of large and small countries—all destination markets in the euro area to
which both the large and small country export. This ‘comparable’ destination
market is equal to the whole euro area, excluding the large and the small country,
corresponding to the dependent variable used in Eq. 1.3 Against this background,
our empirical model is designed to test for asymmetries in relative export gains from
market integration with respect to country size, using the introduction of the euro as
‘natural experiment’, not to give a full account of the trade effects of the euro (see
above).
Notice that this common destination market differs across country pairs L and S.
Missing data are a second reason, why this destination market varies across country
pairs; if exports from the small country S (or the large country L) to some euro area
country are not available for some industry, we excluded them from the exports of
the large country L (the small country S) as well.4 From a theoretical perspective,
this is not a problem, since model (1) could in principle be tested for relative exports
to a single third country, though the empirical testing strategy is more promising if
2 Otherwise, the numerator and the denominator would not be directly comparable: the small country’s
exports to the euro area would include trade with the large country L; the large country’s exports to the
euro area would include trade with the small country S.
3 This choice would systematically bias our main results only under the unrealistic scenario that the small
(large) country concentrates its export activities (more precisely, the additional export activities triggered
by the introduction of the euro) exclusively on the large (small) country destination market.
4 For aggregate exports and SITC1 level data, this is not relevant; at the SITC2 level some bilateral trade
flows are missing, but there are numerous ‘holes’ in the bilateral trade data at the SITC3 level.
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the largest possible destination market is used, i.e. the aggregate euro area with the
aforementioned adjustments.5
The GDP ratio is included to captures changes in country size, and the relative
real effective exchange rate is included to control for other variations in the
competitiveness of the small and large country. Our data for the real effective
exchange rate is from the quarterly report on price and cost competitiveness of the
European Commission (2007); of the various price indices available we opt for unit
labour costs, but his choice is not crucial for our main results (i.e. the coefficient of
the euro dummy). Notice that an increase in the real exchange rate is associated with
a real appreciation vis-a`-vis the other euro area countries.
At the time of the introduction of the euro, the euro area was made up by 11
countries, four of which would be typically considered as large (Germany, France,
Italy, Spain). What is more relevant in our context is not the absolute but the relative
size of the countries, which we simply measure in terms of relative GDP, or
alternatively, relative employment. We argue that a country is relatively large to
another country if it is of double size in terms of GDP or employment; this appears
to be a reasonable threshold, though any choice remains arbitrary to some extent.
Since Belgium and Luxembourg have to be treated as aggregate due to data
availability, we are left with 10 countries. Forming all ratios of large to small
countries, there are 32 of total 45 ratios, whose GDP or employment ratio exceeds
the threshold of 2 (see Table 4 in the Appendix).
We go on to set up a panel by pooling Eq. 1 for all 32 ratios of large to small
countries. To simplify notation, we denote relative variables (large to small
countries) with superscript REL, yielding
ln XRELi;t ¼ ai þ b1 ln GDPRELi;t þ b2 ln ERRELi;t þ c1D€t þ ui;t: ð2Þ
The cross-section dimension i is spanned by the 32 ratios of large to small
countries summarised in Table 4 in the Appendix. Regarding the time dimension,
we opt for a two-period panel with averages over the period 1994–1998 (‘before’)
and 2001–2005 (‘after’). This helps to smooth out short-run shocks and is more
appropriate for our goal of estimating medium- to long-run equilibrium effects.
Another advantage of this choice is that possible non-stationarity of the time series6
is not of concern, given the equivalence of fixed effects estimation (in levels) and
the first-differenced estimator in a two-period panel.
The effects of the euro have not materialised immediately. We assume that the
main transition took place in the years 1999 and 2000. This is a conservative choice;
Baldwin (2006) argues that the break happened very quickly, appearing in 1999. By
excluding the years 1999 and 2000, we ensure that the estimated effects are not
diluted by mixing up the period after the break with the transition period.7
5 The choice of relative trade with all new member states is also motivated by the possibility that when
the market expansion occurs, firms might concentrate on one or a subset of all markets if there is a fixed
component of trade costs (Badinger and Breuss 2006).
6 Time series and panel unit root tests are inconclusive, but this uncertainty would shed some doubt on
the results if longer time series were used.
7 Including the years 1999 and 2000 in the period ‘after’ the break, the results turned out very similar.
This supports the view that the transition took place very quickly.
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Since we are interested in the average effect of the euro on relative export
performance of large to small countries, the parameter c, which measures the
relative gain of the large country, is restricted to be equal across countries.8 The
same is true for the parameters of relative GDP and the relative real exchange rate as
usual in gravity equations. Time-invariant variables such as distance, common
border, common language, etc. are cross-section-specific and thus captured by
cross-section-specific fixed effects. In our two-period setting, the euro-dummy,
taking a value of zero ‘before’ (1994–1998) and a value of one ‘after’ (2001–2005)
can be regarded as a time-specific effect.
Equation 2 is our baseline model. We extend this empirical model to consider
another implication that follows from the theoretical model by Casella (1996),
namely that the magnitude of the small country bonus depends on the size
difference between the large and the small country. This hypothesis can be tested by
adding an interaction term between the euro dummy and relative GDP to Eq. 1,
yielding:
ln XRELi;t ¼ ai þ b1 ln GDPRELi;t þ b2 ln ERRELi;t þ c1D€t þ c2D€t ln GDPRELi;t þ ui;t: ð3Þ
The relative gain of the large country is now given by c1 ? c2 ln GDP
REL. This is
an interesting extension of earlier studies such as Badinger and Breuss (2006), since
it does now only allow for a refined model test, but also serves to identify thresholds
of the size differences required to induce a small country bonus.
Finally, two assumptions underlying the theoretical model should be borne in
mind. There are increasing returns to scale, and trade is of intra-industry type. While
intra-euro area trade may largely be viewed to be of intra-industry type, the
existence if increasing returns cannot be taken as granted at the aggregate level.
Therefore, we will not only estimate Eq. 1 at the aggregate level, but also at the
industry level, in particular for trade disaggregated at the SITC1, SITC2 and SITC3
level.
We use the most comprehensive approach, using data from the UN COMTRADE
database. This yields 10 separate panels at the STIC1 level, 62 panels at the SITC2
level, and 246 panels at the SITC3 level. In terms of Eqs. 2 or 3, only the dependent
variable changes; the controls remain the same as before. On the one hand, there is
no data on value added and real exchange rates at the detailed SITC level used here.
On the other hand, using aggregate data can be justified by the fact that for
industries delivering intermediates to other industries, it is not only the size of the
own sector that matters. Since cycles are not synchronised across industries,
however, its parameter becomes difficult to interpret and is of little interest in itself.
Finally, moving down to an industry-specific equation has a further advantage. At
the aggregate level, the relative GDP might be endogenous as a result of reverse
causality. At a disaggregated level, however, where one single industry contributes
only marginally to total value added, trade in a single industry has a negligible GDP
effect at best, mitigating this possible endogeneity problem. Given the absence of
8 Technically, cross-section-specific parameters for D€ are not estimable in this setup since they would be
perfectly collinear with the fixed effects.
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strong and convincing instruments for the GDP ratio, the use of disaggregated data
provides an important robustness check for the aggregate analysis.
3 Estimation results
3.1 Results for aggregate trade
3.1.1 Basic model
Table 1 presents the estimation results for Eqs. 2 and 3. Notice that in our two-
period panel the fixed effects (FE) estimator is equivalent to the first-differenced
(FD) estimator, both with respect to estimation and inference. That is, our estimates
can be obtained by a pooled regression of D In Xi,t
REL on D In GDPi,t
REL, D In ERi,t
REL,
and DDt
€ (a constant).
The first column of Table 1 shows the least squares (LS) estimates. The relative
GDP is positive as expected with an elasticity around three quarters and highly
significant; the real effective exchange rate shows the right sign but is insignificant.
The same holds true for the coefficient of the euro dummy: it is negative, pointing to
a small country bonus, but not significant at conventional levels.
Table 1 LS and FGLS estimates of Eqs. 2 and 3, aggregate trade
Dependent
variables
is ln XREL
Eq. 2 Eq. 3
LS LSHC FGLS LSHC FGLS
ln GDPREL 0.765***
(0.156)
0.765***
(0.116)
0.764***
(0.026)
0.753***
(0.101)
0.803***
(0.043)
ln ERREL -0.143
(0.232)
-0.143
(0.111)
-0.073
(0.063)
-0.229*
(0.119)
-0.159**
(0.068)
D€ -2.653
(2.978)
-2.653
(1.837)
-3.231***
(0.528)
7.104
(4.357)
4.793*
(2.499)
ln GDPREL 9 D€ -6.111**
(2.569)
-5.303***
(1.403)
Adj. R2 0.417 0.417 0.413 0.455 0.439
SE 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.129 0.131
N 32 32 32 32 32
T 2 2 2 2 2
No. of obs. 64 64 64 64 64
LS, least squares estimates; LSHC, fixed effects estimates using asymptotic heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors; FGLS, feasible generalised least squares estimates, using cross-section weights
To ensure comparability, the standard error of estimation and the adjusted R2 always refers to first-
differences differenced models and are based on unweighted residuals. The euro dummy is divided by
100, such that the coefficient is to be interpreted in per cent
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Notably, there are large differences in the squared standard errors over the cross-
sections, ranging from 0.01 to 0.2. As can be confirmed by more formal tests, there
is pronounced heteroscedasticity in the error term, which has to be addressed for
valid inference. While in a two-period panel, FE and FD estimation produce
identical estimates and standard inference, this is not true for the robust covariance
estimator.9
In order to use the right covariance correction, one has to decide which estimator
(FD or FE) is the proper one, which depends on the properties of the error term u in
Eq. 2: if u is white noise, the FE estimator is efficient; if u it is a random walk, the
FD estimator is efficient. Usually the truth will lie somewhere in between, such that
the strength of the serial correlation is typically used as guide. In a two-period panel,
testing for serial correlation does not appear to be very promising, and theoretical
reasoning does not help along. For comparison, the second column of Table 1 shows
the results, when the corrected covariance, based on the FE estimates, is used. The
standard errors remain fairly large, in particular of the euro dummy, which is the
variable of our primary interest.10
To improve the efficiency of our estimates, we next apply a weighted least
squares approach. This ‘‘is a natural route to follow if the robust standard errors of
the fixed effects estimator are too large to be useful’’ (Wooldridge 2002: 276). In the
present context, cross-section weights are the obvious choice. In that case, the
resulting weighted fixed effects (FE) and first-differences (FD) estimation produce
identical estimates and inference: this has the further advantage that it dispenses us
from making a choice between (inference based on) FD or FE estimation.
The weighted or feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimates of Eq. 2,
using cross-section weights are given in the third column of Table 1. It is reassuring
that the parameter estimates do not differ dramatically from the least squares
approach. At the same time the standard errors of the coefficients shrink
considerably, with the consequence that the coefficient of the euro dummy becomes
significant at the 1% level. The real effective exchange rate remains insignificant,
however.
The goodness of fit hardly differs between the two estimates and is satisfactory
with an R2 of some 40%. In order to ensure comparability, all R2s and standard
errors of regression (SE) reported refer to the original model in first differences and
are based on unweighted residuals. Since there is no precise counterpart to the R2 in
the generalised regression model, the values or the GLS estimates should be
regarded as purely descriptive.
We now consider the economic significance of the estimates; since the euro
dummy is scaled by a factor of 1/100, its coefficient (i.e. effect on relative exports)
can be interpreted in per cent. The estimates point to a relative improvement of the
small country’s export performance by some 3%; this is a quantitatively moderate
though non-negligible effect. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that this figure
9 Compare the corrected covariances for the FE estimator (Wooldridge 2002: 275) and for the FD
estimator (Wooldridge 2002: 282).
10 If the correction is based on the FD residuals, results are similar: p values become smaller as well,
though slightly less.
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represents the bottom line effect. As argued in Badinger and Breuss (2006), there
may also be forces favouring large countries. What our results suggest is that the
small country bonus dominates slightly on average. The ceteris paribus effect
depicted in the model by Casella (1996) is likely to be higher.
A qualification to the results is that endogeneity as a result of reverse causality
from relative exports to relative GDP may bias our estimates. In this case the
coefficient of the GDP ratio (i.e. the slope) would be upward biased, the coefficient
of the euro dummy (i.e. the constant) would be downward biased. Unfortunately, in
the present context there are no convincing, high quality instruments available; any
variable affecting GDP is likely to affect trade as well.
3.1.2 Extended model
We go on to test model (3), which postulates that the relative gains in exports are a
function of relative size. The fourth column in Table 1 shows the fixed effects
estimates with corrected standard errors, column five the FGLS results. Including
the interaction of relative GDP with the euro dummy, the fit of the model improves
slightly. The parameter estimates for relative GDP and the real exchange rate
remain essential unchanged, but the latter becomes significant now as well. In the
unweighted regression, the p value of the euro dummy (D€) improves to 0.110; the
interaction term is significant at the 5% level. In the weighted regression both
variables are significant at the 10 and 1% level, respectively. They are also jointly
significant in both the unweighted regression (p value: 0.026) and the weighted
regression (p value: 0.001).
In the weighted model, the magnitude of the average effect, evaluated at the
mean of the GDP ratio is -4.242%, which is in line with the results for the basic
model (2). Depending on the size difference, the overall effect ranges from -11.232
to 1.748%. The threshold of the size difference in terms of relative GDP, as of
which the small country gains more (i.e. the small country bonus starts to dominate)
is 2.5 (in levels). Only 5 of the 32 size ratios of our sample are below this threshold
(AT-IE, BE-FI, NL-AT, NL-PT, PT-IE). For all other ratios, the size difference
between the large and small country is sufficiently large to yield a negative overall
effect.
Summing up, the estimates for aggregate trade suggest that there appears to be a
small country bonus; there is also evidence that the relative gain of the small over
the large country increases with the size difference. A limitation of the results is that
they are not perfectly robust across all models and estimation methods. We now
take a closer look and turn to the disaggregated analysis.
3.2 Results for disaggregated trade data
3.2.1 Basic model
Using disaggregated data is an important refinement of the empirical testing
strategy: in the model by Casella (1996) trade is of intra-industry type; moreover,
for the small country bonus to exist, there must be increasing returns. Finally, as
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outlined above, the disaggregated approach addresses endogeneity concerns. Notice
that only the dependent variable (i.e. the export ratio) is replaced by industry data in
Eqs. 2 and 3, whereas the control variables (relative GDP and real exchange rate)
remain the same as before.
Table 2 summarises the results of the unweighted and weighted estimates of the
basic model (2) form a bird eye’s perspective.11 It shows the shares of the positive,
negative, and insignificant parameter estimates for the three levels of aggregation.
Of course, we cannot expect the small country bonus to dominate always and
everywhere. After all, there are many forces determining the pattern of trade flows.
What our results again suggest, however, is that country size matters in the case of
‘market expansion’ and that it appears to dominate in a majority of the cases
considered. For all three levels of aggregation and for both the unweighted and
weighted estimates, a negatively significant parameter estimate (suggesting a small
country bonus) is the most frequent result. This is particularly pronounced at the
SITC1 level, but it also holds up at the SITC2 and SITC3 level.
In a next step we check whether the industry-specific results are in line with the
aggregate estimates, by summing up the SITC level–specific estimates using the
respective trade share in total trade as weights. The implied effects generally exceed
those from the estimates for total trade: we arrive at an average aggregate effect of
some 7% at the SITC1 level, 9% at the STIC2 level, and some 5% at the SITC3
level. Taken together with the estimates of model (2) and (3) at the aggregate level
(see Sect. 3.1), our results suggest that the introduction of the euro has led to an
improvement in small euro area countries’ relative export performance ranging from
some 3 to 9%.
Table 2 FGLS and LS estimates of model (2) for disaggregated data, overview of results
Totala Sharesb Average (all)c Average (sign.)c
- ? 0 l r l r
(a) Weighted estimates
SITC1 10 50.00 10.00 40.00 -7.297 0.498 -6.699 0.349
SITC2 62 59.68 20.97 19.35 -9.156 0.365 -9.183 0.350
SITC3 246 47.15 32.52 20.33 -5.228 0.304 -5.387 0.293
(b) Unweighted estimates
SITC1 10 40.00 0.00 60.00 -6.516 1.302 -6.452 0.778
SITC2 62 33.87 14.52 51.61 -9.602 1.360 -8.813 1.182
SITC3 246 31.71 19.51 48.78 -4.863 0.814 -3.979 0.606
a Total number of estimates at the respective SITC levels
b Share of cases where coefficient of D€ is negatively significant, positively significant, and insignificant
respectively; significance level: 5%
c Trade share weighted averages of all (significant) coefficients; standard deviation calculated assuming
that the industry-specific coefficients are independent
11 More detailed results for SITC1 and SITC2 levels are given in Table 5 in the Appendix. Detailed
results for SITC3 levels are available from the authors on request.
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3.2.2 Extended model
Both the aggregate estimates and the disaggregated estimates of model (2) point to a
small country bonus on average; the aggregate estimates of the extended model (3)
also suggest that the magnitude of the size difference is important: according to our
aggregate estimates the small country bonus starts to dominate as of a size ratio of
2.5. We now consider this extended Eq. 3 from a more disaggregated perspective.
We proceed as follows: model (3) is estimated at the SITC1, SITC2, SITC3 level.
We start by showing in how many of the cases the coefficients of the euro dummy
and the interaction of the euro dummy with the GDP ratio are jointly significant.
Only then, the effect of the euro on trade can be reasonably regarded to be a
function of relative market size.
For the cases, where the joint p value (of c1 and c2 in Eq. 3) points to a significant
effect, there are four possible outcomes. Both coefficients can be negative or
positive: then there is an unambiguous small or large country bonus. Table 3 shows
the respective shares of estimates at the different levels of aggregation; the shares of
the cases with a joint negative effect range from 20 to 33%, which is clearly larger
than the share of cases where both coefficients are positive.
Alternatively, the coefficients could have the opposite sign; then the effect is
ambiguous, depending on relative country size. Table 3 shows the respective shares
of the cases where the two coefficients take the opposite sign. For each of these
cases, we calculate the threshold for the size ratio, as of which the direction of the
effect changes. Fortunately, we find that in no single industry, the threshold is of
relevance for our sample: it is always clearly below 2, the smallest size ratio in our
sample. In several cases, the threshold is even below 1 which is actually ruled out in
a specification of ratios from ‘large to small’. Hence we can sharpen the results by
adding the shares with a potentially ambiguous effect, which actually turn out as
Table 3 FGLS and LS estimates of model (3) for disaggregated data, overview of results
Totala Share of
significantb
Distribution of coefficientsc Totald
- - ? ? ? - - ? - - ? ?
(a) Weighted estimates
SITC1 10 60.00 33.33 0.00 66.67 0.00 100.00 0.00
SITC2 62 88.71 27.27 10.91 41.82 20.00 69.09 30.91
SITC3 246 84.96 20.10 11.00 45.93 22.97 66.03 33.97
(b) Unweighted estimates
SITC1 10 40.00 75.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
SITC2 62 53.23 27.27 9.09 51.52 12.12 78.79 21.21
SITC3 246 56.91 20.00 14.29 42.86 22.86 62.86 37.14
a Total number of estimates at the respective SITC levels bShare of cases where coefficient of D€ and
GDPREL D€ are jointly significant; significance level: 5% cDistribution of coefficients among possible
outcomes; the first sign refers to coefficients of D€, second sign to that of the interaction term dTotal
distribution, where the potentially ambiguous cases (? - and - ?), which are unambiguous for our
given of GDP ratios, were assigned to the cases - - and ? ?
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unambiguous with the data at hand, to the shares where both coefficients show the
same sign. The last two columns in Table 3 show the corresponding shares, which
strengthen our previous results: in more than two-third of the cases where the
relative gains depend on relative size, small countries gained relatively more.
4 Conclusions
This paper tests for asymmetries in the trade effects of the euro with respect to
country size. Our empirical analysis is motivated by the new-trade theory model by
Casella (1996), which investigates the distributions of the gains from trade bloc
enlargement among its member states. We argue that the implications of this model
hold up for the introduction of a common currency as well: the intuition is that if
country size matters—i.e. if larger countries are more competitive since a large
domestic market allows them to produce at lower costs—large countries have a
starting advantage. But this also means that any regime shift that induces an increase
in market size (or the size of the market that can be reached with relative ease)
triggers a catching up effect of the small country, since its relative market expansion
is larger. As a consequence, the induced increase in competitiveness is relatively
larger for the small country, such that it should be able to improve its export
performance relative to the large country.
We use a gravity model in ratios, relating relative exports (of the large and small
country to the euro area) to relative GDP and the relative real exchange rate and test
for a small country bonus as a result of the euro, using 32 ratios of large to small
countries over two time periods: ‘before’ (1994–1998) and ‘after’ (2001–2005) the
introduction of the euro. The estimation is carried out both for aggregate exports and
also at the SITC1, SITC2, and SITC3 industry level.
The overall results are supportive to the theoretical predictions by Casella (1996).
This is true both at the aggregate level and at the industry level, where we find that
small countries gained more on average in a majority of the SITC groups
considered. On average small countries improved their export performance relative
to large countries by some 3–9% as a result of the euro. In addition, the magnitude
of the relative gain often depends on the size difference between the large and the
small country.
A broader reading of the results suggests that country size is an important
mechanism shaping economic performance and that a small country bonus exists.
However, the transmission channel considered here—i.e. an in increase in relative
competitiveness as a result of a market expansion—does not appear to be the only
relevant one if there are increasing returns to scale, and mechanisms favouring large
countries (such as group ties and network effects) are conceivable as well. A more
complete and integrated theoretical framework, which depicts the channels through
which country size matters, remains to be developed in future research. Such a
theoretical framework would also help to assess not only the net effect of enlarging
a trade bloc or introducing a common currency, but also to separately identify the
mechanisms at work and their relative importance.
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Appendix
See Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 Size relationships: large to small countries
Relatively
large country i
Relatively
small country j
Relative
EMPL (i to j)
Relative
GDP (i to j)
AT IE 2.5 2.2
BE FI 1.8 2.1
IE 2.5 2.6
DE AT 9.4 9.1
BE 9.5 7.7
ES 2.6 2.5
FI 16.8 15.8
IE 23.8 20.2
NL 4.8 4.6
PT 7.9 11.2
ES AT 3.6 3.6
BE 3.6 3.1
FI 6.5 6.3
IE 9.2 8.1
PT 3.0 4.5
FR AT 5.8 6.8
BE 5.8 5.8
FI 10.3 11.8
IE 14.5 15.1
NL 3.0 3.5
PT 4.8 8.4
IT AT 5.0 6.3
BE 5.0 5.4
FI 9.0 11.1
IE 12.7 14.2
NL 2.6 3.2
PT 4.2 7.9
NL AT 1.9 2.0
FI 3.5 3.4
IE 4.9 4.4
PT 1.6 2.4
PT IE 3.0 1.8
Data on Employment (EMPL) and GDP in 1999 (in PPPs) taken from OECD Economic Outlook
Database
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